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pAbstract
Activation policies aimed at getting working-age people off benefits and into work
have become a buzzword in labour market policies. Yet they are defined and
implemented differently across OECD countries, and their success rates vary too.
The Great Recession has posed a severe stress test for these policies, with some
commentators arguing that they are at best “fair weather” policies. This paper sheds
light on these issues mainly via the lens of recent OECD research. It presents the
stylised facts on how OECD countries have responded to the Great Recession in
terms of ramping up their spending on active labour market policies (ALMPs), a key
component in any activation strategy. It then reviews the macroeconomic evidence
on the impact of ALMPs on employment and unemployment rates. This is followed
by a review of the key lessons from recent OECD country reviews of activation policies.
It concludes with a discussion of crucial unanswered questions about activation.
JEL codes: J01, J08, J68
Keywords: Activation; Active labour market policies; Great Recession; Unemployment
insurance; Benefit conditionality1 Introduction
The Great Recession which hit the world economy in 2007-8 brought to an abrupt end
the period of relatively rapid growth and falling unemployment which had charac-
terised much of the noughties. It led to sharp increases in unemployment in many
countries and a resurgence in the numbers of long-term unemployed. While
unemployment has subsequently fallen back in the United States from its high of over
10% in 2010 to under 7% at the end of 2013, and in Japan too, it has continued to rise
in the European Union: the average EU28 harmonised unemployment rate rose from
under 7% in early 2008 to 10.7% at the end of 2013.
The increases in unemployment have inevitably brought labour market policies back
to centre stage and put the spotlight on the potential of so-called “activation strategies”
to help the unemployed, especially the long-term unemployed and other at-risk groups,
find jobs. At the beginning, the concept of activation was viewed in a very narrow
sense: it meant increasing public resources going into a range of active labour market
policies (ALMPs) as opposed to spending public resources on so-called “passive labour
market policies”, namely unemployment insurance (UI), unemployment assistance2015 Martin; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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lic spending on labour market policies away from passive spending towards spending on
ALMPs and in that way help to reduce structural unemployment (see Appendix 1 for a
brief resume of the history of the concept of activation).
However, the evidence from OECD countries’ experiences in the 1980s and 1990s
suggested that this view of activation was too naïve. It neglected the fact that some
countries with relatively low spending on ALMPs maintained low unemployment rates
while other countries with above-average ALMP spending experienced rising structural
unemployment. It also neglected the fact that economic theory highlighted several po-
tentially important interactions between the generosity of UI systems, the size and mix
of ALMP spending and the degree to which benefit eligibility is subject to conditions
concerning job search and employability1. As a result, the concept of activation was
broadened to embrace these different elements and take due account of possible inter-
actions between them.
While there is no agreed definition of the concept, the OECD currently defines acti-
vation strategies as aiming:
“to bring more people into the effective labour force, to counteract the potentially
negative effects of unemployment and related benefits on work incentives by enforcing
their conditionality on active job search and participation in measures to improve
employability, and to manage employment services and other labour market measures
so that they effectively promote and assist the return to work”2.
Drawing on analytical studies and member country experiences in the 1990s and
early 2000s, the OECD and the European Commission encouraged member countries
to implement effective activation strategies for the unemployed, arguing that the evi-
dence showed that they would help cut unemployment and boost employment. They
also argued the case for extending the remit of activation strategies, suitably modified,
to other working-age recipients of a range of inactivity benefits such as disability/long-
term sickness, early retirement, and sole-parent or social assistance benefits.
The Great Recession and the subsequent hikes in unemployment in many countries
have proved to be a severe stress test for activation strategies, and it is opportune to as-
sess how they are standing up to this test bearing in mind that the current job crisis is
far from over in many countries.
This paper aims to shed light on this important question via the lens of recent OECD
research, notably a series of on-going country reviews of activation policies in selected
countries. It will also chart, using the well-known OECD/Eurostat data base on labour
market policies, how member countries have responded to rising unemployment in
terms of the resources they are devoting to meet this challenge.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents the stylised facts as to
how OECD countries have responded to the job crisis in terms of ramping up their
ALMP and activation efforts. This is followed by a review of the macroeconomic evi-
dence on the impact of ALMPs on unemployment and employment rates. The third
section summarises some of the key lessons that can be drawn from the OECD activa-
tion policy reviews. Section 4 highlights some unanswered questions about activation.
The final section presents some bottom lines.
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Activation, as noted above, is a tricky concept to define and measure since it involves
the institutions responsible for delivering employment services, the payment of UI and
related welfare benefits, the rules for monitoring and controlling the behaviour of
benefit recipients as they search for work and how these rules are implemented in prac-
tice. Ideally, researchers would like to have an agreed and comparable set of indicators
of the intensity of activation available across countries and over time with which to
compare countries’ strategies.
However, no such set of activation indicators exists and researchers must fall back on
a second-best option. This involves using the well-known data base compiled by OECD
and Eurostat. The standard classification of labour market policies followed by the
OECD/Eurostat data base distinguishes between so-called “active” measures (e.g., job-
search assistance, training, public sector job creation and subsidised employment in the
private sector) and “passive” measures (unemployment insurance and related welfare
benefits paid to the unemployed). These active and passive measures lie at the heart of
any activation strategy, so indicators of their intensity and how it has varied with the onset
of the Great Recession can throw light on how activation is being implemented in differ-
ent countries and over time. Both organisations have been collecting data on their
member countries spending on these measures and the numbers of the unemployed
participating in these measures for many years. Appendix 2 provides details on the key
concepts underlying the data base and some important data comparability issues.
Table 1 presents four alternative indicators of the intensity of ALMPs drawing on the
OECD/Eurostat data base: (i) the public spending effort on ALMPs as a per cent of
GDP; (ii) the ratio of ALMP spending to spending on UI/UA benefits; (iii) ALMP
spending per unemployed; and (iv) the ALMP participation rate measured as the stock
of participants on ALMPs as a per cent of the labour force. The indicators are pre-
sented for the years 2007 and 2012 in order to highlight the impact of the Great Reces-
sion on ALMP intensity.
Several interesting patterns can be discerned from the indicators. First, there are large
cross-country differences in the intensity of the public spending effort on ALMPs.
Typically, the Nordic countries tend to have relatively high ALMP intensity in terms of
the indicators (i) to (iii), while most Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, United Kingdom, United States), Japan, Korea and Israel have below-average
intensity. Second, while the public spending effort on ALMPs increased in many coun-
tries after the Great Recession, it generally failed to match the increase in spending on
passive benefits. This can be seen clearly in terms of the trends in indicators (ii) and
(iii). In the past, active spending tended to be essentially unresponsive to the business
cycle. But, as OECD (2012a) showed, this time is different: public spending on ALMPs
has been much more responsive to the increase in unemployment since 2007 than
would have been expected on the basis of past business-cycle patterns. However, the
increase in spending on ALMPs has not been large enough in most cases to maintain
the level of support per unemployed job seeker at the pre-crisis levels. Finally, in terms
of indicator (iv), there are large differences in the ALMP participation rate across
countries but no clear overall trend during the post-Great Recession period.
The next step is to assess the impact of these measures of ALMP intensity on labour
market outcomes.












administraton% of GDP %
Expressed in USD, constant
PPP, constant prices, OECD
reference year
% of labour force
2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012
Australia 0.31 0.29 76 57 4,992 3,921 1.5 2.3
Austria 0.67 0.75 54 58 10,739 12,151 3.8 3.7
Belgium 0.68 0.81 34 39 6,865 7,982 5.4 6.9
Canada 0.28 0.24 51 41 3,176 2,278 0.6 0.5
Chile 0.11 0.10 0 43 464 528
Czech Republic 0.25 0.26 125 108 2,228 1,774 1.2 1.1
Denmark 1.29 2.10 86 124 22,242 17,307 4.7 6.0
Estonia 0.05 0.29 50 66 417 1,078 0.2 1.0
Finland 0.86 1.03 60 71 8,307 8,512 3.7 4.4
France 0.94 0.90 76 62 8,058 6,237 6.1 5.1
Germany 0.75 0.69 58 70 5,912 8,728 4.0 3.3
Greece 0.15 0.22 1,059 934
Hungary 0.35 0.73 97 174 1,992 2,593 2.3 7.4
Ireland 0.64 0.91 70 34 11,286 4,977 3.1 4.0
Israel 0.19 0.17 31 30 1,348 1,517 4.3 4.5
Italy 0.46 0.45 67 28 5,250 2,631 6.9 4.6
Japan 0.18 0.21 64 62 2,863 2,998
Korea 0.13 0.32 52 107 2,147 5,903
Luxembourg 0.46 0.62 88 95 18,678 18,731 6.2 7.9
Mexico 0.01 0.01 87 63
Netherlands 1.10 0.98 78 51 22,153 12,783 3.4 4.1
New Zealand 0.34 0.29 148 78 4,439 2,150 2.0 2.3
Norway 0.55 0.54 262 154 20,054 15,061 2.3 2.2
Poland 0.50 0.42 98 140 1,889 1,753 3.6 3.6
Portugal 0.51 0.49 49 30 2,550 1,330 3.2 3.4
Slovak Republic 0.22 0.26 61 59 782 790 2.8 3.1
Slovenia 0.20 0.27 67 32 2,130 1,514 3.5 2.8
Spain 0.79 0.89 54 31 5,478 2,202 19.6 11.4
Sweden 1.02 1.33 138 202 10,955 10,988 1.2 1.1
Switzerland 0.55 0.57 98 97 10,429 9,301 1.2 1.2
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Table 1 Indicators of the intensity of ALMPs, 2007 and 2012 (Continued)
United Kingdom 0.31 0.41 194 137 4,161 3,461
United States 0.12 0.12 40 30 2,027 1,459
OECD 0.50 0.57 72 67 3,971 3,605 3.6 3.6
Note: The data shown should not be treated as strictly comparable across countries or through time, since data at the level of
individual countries in some cases deviate from standard definitions and methods, and certain programmes or programme
categories are not always included in the data for participants stocks. See www.oecd.org/els/employment-outlook-statistical-
annex.htm, which provides a general introductory note about scope and comparability, tables for expenditure and
participants in the main programme categories and subcategories, country-specific notes, and access to the online database.
Source: For European Union countries and Norway, European Commission (2014), Labour Market Policy (http://epp.
eurostat.eu.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/labour_market_policy) and detailed underlying data supplied to
OECD by the European Commission with certain Secretariat adjustments. For other countries: OECD Database on Labour
Market Programmes, http://dx/doi.org/10.1787/data-00312-en.
a. Data for Australia, Ireland, Israel, Luxembourg, Poland and Spain refer to 2011; data for Greece and the United
Kingdom refer to 2010; and data for Chile refer to 2008.
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The impact of ALMPs on labour market outcomes has been assessed through both mi-
cro and macro studies. The former consists of a very large body of evidence composed
of evaluations of individual ALMPs. Such studies use a range of methods from rela-
tively straightforward comparisons between control groups and programme partici-
pants to experimental studies using random assignment of participants. The outcome
variables in such studies are typically the exit rate for participants from benefits to a
job and/or post-programme earnings. The country coverage of such evaluations has
widened considerably in recent years.
In line with the growth in the micro-evaluation literature, there are many good sur-
veys of the findings from this literature, e.g., Heckman et al. (1999); Martin and Grubb
(2001); and Card et al. (2010). The picture that emerges from these surveys is one of
mixed effectiveness of ALMPs. While there is much variation across studies and across
countries, a broad concensus about effectiveness would be as follows: job-search pro-
grammes and monitoring of the behaviour of jobseekers tend to be cost-effective; some
training programmes, especially those tied to local labour market needs, are also effect-
ive once a time window of several years is chosen; targeted hiring subsidies can also
work, though these are often subject to significant deadweight and displacement effects;
public sector job creation schemes invariably do not work.
While the microeconomic evaluation literature is extremely valuable in quantifying
what works and what does not among individual ALMPs, it cannot be used to quantify
the macroeconomic effects of ALMP intensity. There are scale effects associated with
the size of public spending on ALMPs, and the composition of public spending on the
different ALMPs also tends to vary over the cycle. These aggregate effects are not
captured in the micro literature.
For this reason, I will focus here on a brief overview of the macroeconomic litera-
ture on the impact of ALMPs on the aggregate labour market. This approach typically
relies upon cross-country econometric analysis based essentially on large panel data
sets. The hypothesis being tested in this literature is that ALMP intensity, if well
designed and targeted, can reduce the structural unemployment rate. This is not a new
hypothesis: it can be traced back to a seminal 1977 paper by Martin Baily and James
Tobin, which argued the case for investing in ALMPs in terms of targeting them to
jobseekers with less wage-bargaining power, thereby serving to lower the NAIRU3.
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addressed this hypothesis and the principal conclusions that can be drawn from them
concerning the macroeconomic effectiveness of ALMP intensity. In interpreting the re-
sults, it is important to bear in mind that the econometric estimates of the impact of
ALMP intensity on unemployment and employment rates are plagued by endogeneity:
this problem arises because ALMP spending is not exogenous but instead responds to
changing labour market conditions. Many of the studies in Table 2 are aware of this
problem and have tried to control for endogeneity using various instrumental variable
methods. But this potential bias still remains an issue in interpreting the findings of the
macroeconometric literature on ALMPs.
Putting the endogeneity concern to one side, the majority of the studies reviewed in
Table 2 suggest that ALMP spending does reduce unemployment and long-term
unemployment. The one major exception to this finding is the study by Baker et al.
(2005), which found an insignificant impact. With reference to the concensus findingsTable 2 Macro-econometric evidence of the impact of ALMPs on unemployment and
employment
Study Outcome Comments
Murtin and Robin (2013) ** Same result obtained with a structural model.
De Serres and Murtin
(2013)
** ALMP spending, particularly on placement and employment services,
reduces unemployment and its persistence over time.
Estevâo (2003) ** ALMP spending increased business-sector employment rates in 15




** Spending on labour-market training lowers unemployment; high ALMP
spending also reduces the increase in unemployment associated with
generous unemployment benefits and negative shocks.
Baker, Glyn, Howell and
Schmitt (2005)
No ALMP effect insignificant.
Belot and Van Ours (2004) ** ALMP spending on labour-market training lowers unemployment
substantially, smaller negative impact for PES spending and none for
subsidised jobs; higher spending on training reduces the negative
impact of unemployment benefits in raising unemployment.
Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps
and Zoega (2000)
** ALMP spending reduces unemployment; the coefficient is insignificant
when Sweden is excluded from the sample.
Bertola, Blau and Khan
(2002a, 2002b)




n.a. ALMP only entered in interaction terms; higher ALMP spending reduces
the responsiveness of unemployment to negative shocks.
Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta (1998)
** Replicates the finding in Scarpetta (1996) that ALMP spending has a
small negative impact on unemployment, but a much bigger impact if
Sweden is excluded from the sample. Presents evidence of significant
interactions between ALMP spending and UI benefit replacement rates.
Nickell (1997, 1998) ** For long-term unemployed only.
Scarpetta (1996) ** Small impact on reducing unemployment that becomes larger and
more significant with Sweden excluded.
OECD (2009) * Looks at the impact of ALMPs on unemployment dynamics; shows that
the effectiveness of ALMP spending in raising the exit rate from
unemployment depends on the business cycle; the effectiveness of
jobseeker support and labour demand policies decreases in a
depressed labour market while training becomes more effective.
No: No significant direct impact on unemployment.
n.a.: Not available.
*: Significant positive/negative impact on unemployment in most but not all cases.
**: Significant negative impact on unemployment in all cases.
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above, a few of the studies in Table 2 try to disaggregate between the four major types
of ALMPs: job-search assistance, training, public sector employment and wage subsid-
ies. It is encouraging that they find results as to the effectiveness of the different
ALMPs which match those that come from surveys of the microeconomic evaluation
literature4.
In sum, the weight of evidence from the macroeconometric cross-country literature
is that ALMP intensity, which is a key component in an activation strategy, can help
cut unemployment.4 3. Key lessons from the OECD activation policy reviews5
This section seeks to complement the previous one by focussing on country case stud-
ies that the OECD is conducting on activation policies in member countries since 2008.
So far, it has published reviews of seven countries: Ireland6, Norway7, Finland8,
Switzerland9, Japan10, Australia11 and the United Kingdom12. The aim of the reviews is
to highlight the factors that result in effective activation from those that do not and to
make policy recommendations to countries to improve their activation strategies and/
or to adapt them to changing conditions.
The reviews address a range of questions: How do benefit generosity, decentralisation
of the public employment service (PES) and specific interventions affect unemployment
spells? How are these interactions interpreted in the context of the countries under
review by taking account of the fact that their histories and starting points are differ-
ent? How can activation policies that are designed to assist unemployment benefit
recipients get back to work be adapted to assist working-age recipients of other inactive
benefits with very different needs?
In what follows, I summarise my views on the main lessons from the reviews. But it
is important to read the published reviews and the overview published in OECD
(2013a) to get the full flavour of the analyses and policy recommendations. One
important caveat to bear in mind is that the seven countries in question are not a
representative sample of OECD countries, and there is a selection bias in that they put
themselves forward for review by the OECD Secretariat.4.1 Japan: the PES experiences the positive spillover from a “Chasm” in benefit coverage
Figure 1 shows the trend in the Japanese unemployment rate since 1970. It high-
lights the very low unemployment rates prior to the two oil price shocks of the
1970s, the persistent upward drift in the unemployment rate that occurred in the
1980s, 1990s and the early 2000s bringing it to a peak of over 5%, and the subse-
quent drop to below 4% currently, despite a brief hike when the Great Recession
hit. Thus, while structural unemployment has increased in Japan over the past
three decades, the rise has been contained to moderate levels which other OECD
countries can only envy.
The OECD review argues that this relative success is due, in part, to the spe-
cific conditions within which activation operates in Japan. In particular, the re-
view highlights what it terms as a “chasm in benefit coverage” in Japan. The








Percentage of the labour force
Figure 1 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in Japan, 1970-2013. Note: Blue shaded areas
refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates based on the
OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
Martin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:4 Page 8 of 29unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefit eligibility being extremely re-
stricted compared with other countries, social assistance is the last-resort income
support for those unemployed in Japan who are either ineligible for UI benefits
or who have exhausted their entitlements–the duration of UI benefits is relatively
short in Japan compared with the vast majority of other OECD countries. Eligi-
bility for social assistance in Japan is also very strict: it is based on stringent
asset tests, and Duell et al. (2010a) show that there is very strict application of
these asset tests, at the local level.
The upshot of this is that an unemployed person in Japan who has no UI benefit
eligibility, or who has exhausted this benefit entitlement, has a very strong incentive to
find work. In this specific situation, the Japanese PES does not need to devote a major
effort to activation since the unemployed have strong work incentives. As a result, the
activation effort in Japan, as measured by the public spending effort on ALMPs, is rela-
tively small. In 2012, Japan spent only 0.2% of GDP on ALMPs, less than half of the
OECD average.
In countries such as Japan where eligibility for UI benefits is strict and benefit levels –
as proxied by the net (after-tax) benefit replacement rate – are not very generous com-
pared with most other OECD countries, the intensity of activation can be rather mild.
In addition, the OECD review gives the Japanese PES a reasonably effective rating. Thus,
the combination of a not-too-generous UI/SA benefit system with relatively mild
activation has enabled Japan to maintain its unemployment rate within the 4-5% range.4.2 Ireland: high public spending effort on ALMPs but no activation, at least until
recently
Figure 2 shows the roller-coaster ride of the Irish unemployment rate over the past
three decades. Following the two oil price shocks, the unemployment rose sharply to a
peak of 17% in the mid-1980s. It remained close to this peak until the mid-1990s. Then











Percentage of the labour force
Figure 2 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in Ireland, 1980-2013. Note: Blue shaded areas
refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates based on the
OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
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stable around this trough until the Great Recession hit. As the Great Recession co-
incided with the bursting of a big property bubble in Ireland, the Irish economy slumped,
and unemployment soared to a peak of over 15% in 2012 before beginning to fall back as
the economy has recovered. The unemployment rate is currently around 11%.
The Irish review–see Grubb et al. (2009)–highlighted the fact that Ireland was like
the emperor who had no clothes insofar as activation was concerned! There was much
lip service paid by the Irish authorities to activation principles, and the public spending
effort on ALMPs was well above average: in 2011, the Irish public spending effort was
0.9% of GDP compared with an OECD average of just under 0.6%. But there was no
implementation of the principles. The Irish legislation said that the unemployed had to
engage in active job search as a condition of receiving benefits, their behaviour had to
be monitored effectively, etc. None of this was implemented in practice. Part of the ex-
planation for this lack of implementation of the basic principles of activation in Ireland
was due to the complacency that came from a period in which the economy experi-
enced full employment for almost a decade. During this period, the Irish PES (Fas) and
the benefit agency basically left the unemployed to their own devices.
The situation has changed radically since 2008. The steep hike in unemployment post
2008 coincided with a dramatic loss of public confidence in Fas due to a series of
internal scandals which attracted widespread negative publicity. This forced the Irish
authorities to shift course radically. They began by amalgamating the benefits agency
with the PES to form a new “one-stop-shop” service called Intreo. By the way, the
OECD had been urging the Irish authorities for about 15 years to undertake this
amalgamation as a way of improving activation, and they had steadfastly ignored its
advice until the crisis hit and Fas collapsed–an example of the crisis producing at least
one positive outcome!
Reforms were also introduced to the benefit system. During the Celtic Tiger period,
Ireland increased the generosity of its benefits system very significantly. Indeed, the in-
crease in net benefit replacement rates over the period from the end of the 1990s to
2007 was one of the largest in the OECD countries, moving Ireland from about average
in terms of benefit generosity to one of the top countries. However, driven by both the
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desire to boost work incentives for the unemployed, benefit generosity has been cut
back in recent years13.
The Irish authorities have taken many steps to ensure that Intreo will operate an ef-
fective activation regime from now on. But they face huge obstacles given the very large
stocks of unemployed, especially of the long-term unemployed whose share of total un-
employment doubled from almost 30% in 2007 to over 60% in 2013.
In order to increase the capacity of Intreo to cope with such large numbers of long-
term unemployed, the Irish authorities have announced plans to launch an innovative
programme called JobPath. Under this new programme, the Irish Department of Social
Protection will sub-contract reemployment services with private employment agencies
under performance-related contracts–in taking this major step, they have been much
influenced by the examples of the UK’s Work Programme and Australia’s Job Services
Australia14. But the experiences of both Australia and the UK suggest that it is a very
difficult and time-consuming task to design and implement such contracts with private
employment service providers in ways that will yield the desired economic and social
outcomes, especially for the long-term unemployed. In addition, the few micro studies
which have been conducted in Ireland to date have highlighted the ineffectiveness of
most of the existing ALMPs and the lack of adequate targeting of them to the needs of
the long-term unemployed15.
In sum, Ireland is at long last trying to design and implement an effective activation
strategy. But it will require a new mentality in the agencies involved in the exercise and
a change in social norms, a willingness to enforce job-search requirements effectively
and the development of a performance-oriented culture in Intreo that will focus on
getting the unemployed off benefits and into work. This is likely to be a long-haul task
in Ireland.4.3 Finland: a unique PES structure, a unique history and poor outcomes in the past–but
looking better now
Finland, like Ireland, has experienced a roller-coaster ride in its unemployment rate
since the end of the 1980s. While there was an increase in unemployment in the
1970s following the two oil price shocks, Finnish unemployment was relatively stable
at around 4% during the 1980s. The situation changed dramatically at the beginning
of the 1990s. Finland underwent a serious economic slump following the collapse of
the former Soviet Union and the bursting of a local property bubble. This led to a
huge spike in the unemployment rate, which peaked at over 16% in the mid-1990s
(see Figure 3). It then dropped back steadily to a low of 6.4% before it rose again
following the Great Recession.
The Finnish economy was particularly hard hit by the Great Recession: it underwent
a double dip post 2008, and output at the time of writing is still about 6% below its
2007 peak. Against this background, the subsequent increase in unemployment was
surprisingly moderate, and the Finnish unemployment rate in 2014 Q3 (8.6%, season-
ally adjusted) was still well below the euro area average of 11.5%. In addition, unlike
the situation in many other EU countries, there was no increase in the incidence of
long-term unemployment in Finland: indeed, the share of long-term unemployment in












Figure 3 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in Finland, 1970-2013. Note: Blue shaded areas
refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates based on the
OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
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attributes this relative success in moderating the rise in overall unemployment and sta-
bilising the share of long-term unemployment in the face of a steep downturn to rela-
tively effective activation policies. However, the latter is a fairly recent phenomenon.
The roller-coaster pattern of the Finnish unemployment rate over the past two de-
cades reflects in part, as Duell et al. (2009a) show, a past history of relatively ineffective
activation due to a unique and weak decentralised PES structure interacting with na-
tional financing of the benefit system. This system has been transformed significantly
over the past decade, resulting in the improved performance cited above.
The Finnish PES has no national-level management. It is effectively managed at the
local level by local labour committees which bring together the social partners and the
benefit agencies. These committees determine not only benefit eligibility but also the de-
gree to which benefit sanctions for non-respect of job-search obligations and other benefit
eligibility criteria are applied at the local level. Municipalities, which are responsible for
social assistance benefits, also provide some reemployment services for their unemployed
clients. In 2004, separate labour force service centres were established, drawing upon staff
from the local PES offices and the municipal services to provide more specialised assist-
ance to the most at-risk job seekers.
There was national financing of the benefit system in the 1980s and 1990s, and this,
combined with the de facto local management of the activation system, led to persist-
ently high unemployment following the steep downturn of the early 1990s. A very im-
portant reform of the financing of the benefit system, particularly at the local level,
took place in 2006 when the municipalities accepted to pay half of the cost of benefits
for the long-term unemployed. This forced them to attach much greater importance to
effective activation and to try to ensure that the suite of ALMPs at their disposal is a
cost-effective one.
Unlike the Irish case, the Finnish authorities were unwilling to lower the relatively
generous benefit replacement rates in the UI system to improve work incentives. In-
stead, they have relied on enforcing stricter conditionality in the benefit system com-
bined with greater emphasis on cost-effective ALMPs to yield better labour market
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ALMPs than either the OECD or EU averages: in 2012, its active spending effort was
just over 1% of GDP.
As a result of these reforms, outcomes improved significantly over the past decade,
even allowing for the hike in unemployment following the Great Recession. The
Finnish case is an interesting illustration of how the interaction between the financing
of the benefit system and the local responsibilities for the design and delivery of em-
ployment services, if they are tied one to the other, can increase the incentives for local
actors to make activation more effective. It is also an interesting case study of a country
which has managed to offset the adverse work incentive effects of a relatively generous
benefit system by imposing strict benefit conditionality and making use of referrals to a
relatively effective set of ALMPs.4.4 Australia: active national management a key factor behind the success of the
quasi-market for employment services
As Figure 4 shows, there was a persistent upward trend in the Australian unemploy-
ment rate across successive business cycles from 1970 to the mid-1990s. The un-
employment rate peaked at around 11% and then began a prolonged period of decline
which brought it to a low of just over 4% in 2008 before the Great Recession began to
bite. While there has been some increase in unemployment since then, the rise has
been very moderate and the current unemployment rate of around 6% is well below
the OECD and EU averages.
Since the mid-1990s, the Australian employment rate has increased by almost 10 per-
centage points to 72% in 2013 compared with an OECD average of just over 65%. The
incidence of long-term unemployment in Australia, even though it has risen slightly
since 2008, at 19.3% in 2013, was far below the OECD average of 35.3%.
OECD (2012b) concludes that the Australian innovation of relying upon a quasi-
market in employment services to activate benefit recipients and, in particular, the way
in which the market design of the pay-for-performance systems and the incentives pro-








Percentage of the labour force
Figure 4 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in Australia, 1970-2013. Note: Blue shaded areas
refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates based on the
OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
Martin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:4 Page 13 of 29providers, has contributed significantly to this very good labour market performance
over the past two decades.
Australia is a rather unique country in the OECD in terms of activation policies
because it abolished the public employment service in the mid-nineties, and now there
are only private providers of employment services competing under contracts from the
national ministry. Some other OECD countries have ventured part of the way down
this route: the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are two leading examples, soon
to be joined by Ireland, but none has gone so far as to abolish its PES.
The private providers in Australia are a mix of profit and not-for-profit providers of em-
ployment services. When the first contract round was introduced in the late nineties, there
were three hundred providers. Currently, there are around 90 contracted providers of
employment services, so the employment services market has undergone significant con-
solidation over the past two decades. The providers compete with each other at over 1,600
sites throughout Australia. Some of the leading providers are not-for profit organisations,
such as the Salvation Army or Mission Australia. But there are also very large private pro-
viders such as MAX Employment who are extremely active in the market as well.
The providers compete on the basis of pay-for-performance contract which are
drawn up, designed and monitored by the Australian Department of Employment. The
government issues contracts to the providers based on performance for periods of three
to four years. Provider performance is rated under this system. There is a form of rat-
ings which are called star ratings, which are based mainly on econometrically-adjusted
estimates of the performance of the providers, taking account of the caseload and the
state of the local labour market and other factors. Providers are driven out of the mar-
ket at the end of the contract period if their performance is not judged to be up to
standard. Or some of them go out of business because they are unable to make money
from the remuneration that they get under the contract.
While there are no experimental studies of the impacts of activation in Australia,
there are some very good quasi-experiments which back up the OECD (2012b) conclu-
sion that the system of a quasi-market with contracting of this kind in Australia has
worked in terms of contributing to the relatively good labour market performance of
the past two decades. Naturally, other factors such as the prolonged terms-of-trade
boom and the major reform of collective bargaining arrangements in Australia over the
same period have also contributed to this performance, but it seems undeniable that
effective activation has to take part of the credit too.
However, while it has worked very well for activating unemployment benefit recipi-
ents and more recently for activating sole parents with young children, the quasi-
market system has been much less successful in terms of activating disability benefit
recipients. Those are people who are on long-term sickness or disability benefits who
have been judged to have very reduced work capacity. The system was extended in the
recent contract round to include these recipients, but the results in terms of speeding
up the exit rate from benefits to sustainable jobs are much less satisfactory for that
group than they have proved to be for UI benefit recipients or recipients of sole-parent
benefits. And that is the major challenge that the Australian authorities face as they go
into a new contract round. How do they make the private providers more responsive
and more active in terms of helping people with long-term disability and health prob-
lems to get off benefits and into work, even into some form of part-time work?
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to deliver effective activation
Figure 5 shows that, while there was a steep jump in the Swiss unemployment rate in
the early 1990s from about 1% to 4%, since then it has remained broadly stable around
this level with some cyclical variations. It goes without saying that an unemployment
rate around 4% would be regarded as a miracle outcome in other European countries:
at the end of 2013, for example, the lowest unemployment rate in the EU28 was 4.9%
in Austria.
Duell et al. (2010b) argue that specific features of the Swiss activation system have
contributed to this favourable outcome. Switzerland has a relatively generous UI system
compared with other countries, and it has a very long and strong tradition of decentral-
isation of responsibilities for labour market policies to the cantons. In Switzerland,
there is a very strong decentralisation of active labour market programmes under con-
trols, combined with a certain Germanic discipline16. Switzerland has a totally decen-
tralised network of employment offices across the 26 cantons. Once you have
exhausted UI benefits, the assistance benefits are 100% financed at the cantonal level.
The Swiss approach to activation seeks to offset the impact of relatively generous UI
benefits on work incentives by strict enforcement, of job-search requirements, relatively
high spending on ALMPs (in 2012, Switzerland spent 0.6% of GDP on ALMPs) and
generous in-work benefits to encourage the unemployed to accept low-wage jobs.
Legislation in Switzerland requires the unemployed individuals to do all they can to
shorten the duration of their unemployment spells, and the success in achieving these
objectives is a very important outcome measure in the national performance rating
system that exists for the local employment officers. Publication of the ratings for each
local PES office has helped to raise the average performance of the system nationwide.
In addition, some novel evaluation evidence that has been produced using Swiss data
shows that the PES caseworkers do play an important role in determining successful
outcomes in terms of increasing the exit rate from UI benefits to work17. And the kinds
of strategies that the caseworkers use to nudge their clients into jobs are also very im-
portant elements in a successful outcome. The role of caseworkers and the strategies







Percentage of the labour force
Figure 5 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in Switzerland, 1970-2013. Note: Blue shaded
areas refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates based on
the OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
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that they matter.
However, the effective activation stance towards recipients of UI benefits has meant
that the Swiss PES has devoted less attention to other, more difficult-to-place job-
seekers. This partly explains the fact that the share of long-term unemployment in
Switzerland was 33% in 2013, almost equal to the OECD average of around 35%, while
its unemployment rate was much below average.
At the same time, the numbers of working-age adults receiving disability benefits has
risen sharply over the past two decades, with much of the growth being driven by men-
tal ill-health. By 2012, 4.7% of the population aged 20–64 was in receipt of a disability
benefit. This has proved to be very costly for the public purse: OECD (2013c) notes
that in 2008 Switzerland spent 2.6% of GDP on sickness and disability benefits, five
times what it spent on UI and related welfare benefits.
OECD (2013c) points out that it has proved hard to transfer the success achieved in
activating UI benefit recipients to disability benefit recipients. Coordination between
the many actors in the health system, the cantons, the private sector (which is heavily
involved in sickness health insurance and in the delivery of employment and rehabilita-
tion services) and employers has proved difficult to achieve. While the reforms which
were implemented over the past decade have had some successes–new disability
benefit claims began to decline from the mid-2000s on, and the stock of claimants
also began to drop a few years later–it is still an uphill task for the Swiss author-
ities to activate many such clients back into work, especially those suffering from
mental ill-health.4.6 Norway: effective activation keeps unemployment low but has been much less
successful for those on long-term sickness/disability benefits
Figure 6 highlights the fact that Norway has one of the lowest unemployment rates in
the OECD: it currently stands at just over 3%. While it was about half that level in the
1970s, the 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a sustained rise in unemployment which








Percentage of the labour force
Figure 6 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in Norway, 1970-2013. Note: Blue shaded areas
refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates based on the
OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
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the present day. It is noticeable that the Great Recession had a relatively mild impact
on the Norwegian labour market compared with most other European or OECD coun-
tries. In addition, Norway has maintained a relatively high employment rate: in 2013,
its employment rate of almost 76% was the third highest in the OECD after Switzerland
and Iceland. In addition, Norway has the lowest incidence of long-term unemployment
in Europe and the second lowest in the OECD after Korea: in 2013, the share of long-
term unemployment in total unemployment was only 9.2%, virtually identical to its
2007 level.
However, part of the gloss of this relatively strong labour market performance is re-
moved when one considers the other side of the coin: Norway has a relatively high
benefit dependency rate among the working-age population. Duell et al. (2009b)
showed that almost one fifth of the working-age population in Norway in 2007 was re-
ceiving long-term sickness or disability benefits. They also highlighted a strong trend
rise in the long-term sickness/disability dependency rate over the period since 1970, a
rise which continued after the mid-1990s when, as noted above, the unemployment
rate dropped back from its peak towards the 3% level. A striking stylised fact to show
the magnitude of the disability benefit issue among the working-age population in
Norway is that it currently spends about 5% of GDP on long-term sickness/disability
benefits, whereas it only spends 0.4% of GDP on unemployment benefits! Another
worrying trend is that, in recent years, more and more young people have been receiv-
ing disability benefits, often diagnosed with mental ill-health. When this is combined
with evidence showing for Norway that the exit rate from long-term sickness/disability
benefits to work is close to zero, this implies a huge loss of economic output, not to
mention its large social cost or the cost to the public purse.
Duell et al. (2009b) argue that the Norwegian activation system has been one factor
behind the relatively low unemployment rates in Norway. While the UI system is rela-
tively generous in terms of both duration of benefits and net replacement rates, the
work disincentive effects have been offset by strict eligibility criteria and relatively strict
job-search requirements. Norway also spends quite a lot on ALMPs: in 2012, it spent
just over 0.5% of GDP on ALMPs. In this sense, there is some similarity between the
Swiss and Norwegian approaches to activation of UI benefit recipients.
The problem is that, just as in the Swiss case, the activation approach works for UI
benefit recipients, but it does not work for those working-age individuals with health-
related issues even when they have some work capacity or could be assisted to work
part-time. The Norwegian government has tried two broad tracks to tackle this chal-
lenge. First, it has tried via social partnership: the unions and employers have adopted
voluntary agreements at the branch and firm level (so-called Inclusive Workplace
Agreements) to reduce sickness absence. But a recent OECD review notes that:
“It is hard to find hard evidence for any effects of the IWA on disability and sickness
absence in the past decade …” OECD (2013b), p.62).
It attributes this failure to the voluntary nature of the IWAs and to the fact that there
has been no change to the very generous sickness benefit rate or how much of it is
charged to employers18.
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new integrated agency (NAV). The NAV services were to be combined with municipal
services in one-stop shops providing coordinated services to all working-age clients re-
ceiving income support.
Both tracks aim to cut sickness absence and to boost vocational rehabilitation oppor-
tunities for people with health problems so that they can re-enter the work force. But it
is proving to be a very hard task in Norway to achieve these objectives. This example
highlights yet again one of the limitations of existing activation strategies once the cli-
ent group is expanded beyond the range of UI benefit recipients to embrace other re-
cipients of inactive benefits who have much more heterogeneous needs and who are
often at the margins of the labour force.4.7 United Kingdom: a successful activation regime for the unemployed but facing
difficulties in extending this to other recipients of inactive benefits
The UK unemployment rate exhibited a strong upward trend over the period from
1970 to 1986, when it peaked at over 11% (see Figure 7). It then dropped back until the
recession at the beginning of the 1990s when it rose again to just over 10% in 1993.
Subsequently, it began a sustained drop to around the 5% level before the Great Reces-
sion hit the economy. It then climbed back to 8% in 2011 before dropping back
slowly–in the third quarter of 2014, the unemployment rate was 6%. The job crisis also
saw an increase in long-term unemployment: its share of total unemployment rose
from 23.7% in 2007 to 36.3% in 2013. It should be added, however, that given the rela-
tively large drop in UK output following the crisis, the rise in unemployment was much
more moderate than what was predicted by most commentators when the crisis hit
based on previous cyclical episodes.
But the relatively good unemployment performance of the UK economy has to be
nuanced by the long-standing problem of large numbers of working-age people re-
ceiving disability benefits. OECD (2014a) notes that, at the end of 2012, over 2.5 mil-
lion people (almost 7% of the working-age population) were in receipt of a disability








Figure 7 Trend in harmonised unemployment rates in the United Kingdom, 1970-2013. Note: Blue
shaded areas refer to period of economic contraction (based on the output gap). Source: OECD estimates
based on the OECD Short-term Labour Market Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook Databases.
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case that around 40% of claimants for a disability benefit are suffering from mental
ill-health.
Many commentators, including the OECD, argue that the relatively good UK
unemployment record since the mid-1990s and the relatively mild hike in unemploy-
ment after 2008 owe much to effective activation policies which were first put in place
in the late 1980s and subsequently much refined and extended. These policies were put
in place by both Conservative and Labour governments and, most recently, by the
Coalition government.
The UK activation regime began with the first Restart interviews in 1986. Benefit
conditionality was tightened through the early 1990s. The unemployment benefit was
replaced by the Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) in 1996, a flat-rate benefit paid for six
months. The Blair government introduced from 1998 onwards a series of so-called
“New Deals” targeted at specific groups with the aim of helping them get back to work:
the groups included youth, long-term JSA claimants aged 25–49, lone parents, older
workers and the disabled. The PES was amalgamated with the benefits agency to form
Jobcentre Plus (JCP); the new agency became fully operational in 2002.
It should be added, however, that the drop in UK unemployment from the mid-1980s
until the end of the 1990s was matched by a rise in the numbers of working-age per-
sons on Invalidity Benefit (IB). OECD (2014a) points out that the success of the activa-
tion strategy for UI benefit recipients was one of the factors driving the rise in the IB
caseload in that period. This led to a shift in focus for activation measures to be ex-
tended to recipients of other inactive benefits, namely IB and sole-parent benefits. As
noted above, the Pathways to Work programme was introduced in 2003 with the aim
of helping IB claimants find work. However, participation in it was voluntary, at least
until 2008. In 2008, IB was replaced by the Employment and Support allowance (ESA)
for new claimants for disability benefits who were required to undergo both a Work
Capability Assessment (WCA) and a work-focussed interview. It is noticeable that
post-2008, and continuing under the Coalition government, the tightening of condi-
tionality requirements for working-age people in receipt of disability benefits led to de-
clines in the inflows and stocks of people on such benefits. Participation on the New
Deal for Lone Parents was also on a voluntary basis in the first instance. In 2008, job-
search conditionality was extended to lone parents whose youngest child was aged 12;
in 2010 this age limit was dropped to 7.
These changes to the activation regime introduced by the Labour governments were
backed up by a series of changes to the tax and benefit system and the introduction in
1999 of a national minimum wage. The aim of these changes was to “make work pay”,
i.e., to ensure that moving off an inactive benefit (JSA, lone-parent, IB) into work would
lead to a financial gain for the individual and his family. Given the complexity of the
design of the UK’s benefit system–benefits are flat-rate and means-tested with a variety
of top-ups via cash benefits or tax credits; there are also earnings disregards by which
benefits are withdrawn as work income increases–achieving this objective is very diffi-
cult and it can create so-called “poverty traps” for certain groups. Be that as it may,
these reforms did increase work incentives for many lone parents, and there is no
doubt that, when combined with the activation reforms, they accounted for part of the
strong rise in lone-parent employment from almost 45% in 1997 to nearly 57% in 2009. But
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for many second earners in couple households.
When the Coalition government led by David Cameron took office in 2010, they
announced significant reforms to both the activation regime and the suite of “make
work pay” policies. In particular, they introduced a new flagship welfare-to-work initia-
tive called the Work Programme. Under this initiative, private employment service
providers were to be sub-contracted on a regional basis to provide reemployment ser-
vices to the long-term unemployed, the young unemployed and disability benefit claim-
ants over a two-year spell which is mandatory for claimants. The 18 prime contractors
are mainly for-profit companies; though, there are also two non-profits among them19.
Prime contractors are funded mainly on the basis of pay-for-sustained job outcomes;
though, there is also an initial, small attachment fee20. Fees for successful outcomes are
larger for more at-risk clients to reduce the well-known “creaming or parking”
problem. The private providers were offered long-term (five-year) contracts to entice a
sufficient number of them to enter the market.
Some elements of the design of WP were inspired by the Australian innovation, but
there are also significant differences in the two models. For example, JCP continues in
operation alongside the private providers to serve the needs of the short-term un-
employed–unlike the Australian model where the PES was abolished. In another
significant divergence from the Australian case, the Department of Work and Pensions
(DWP) allows the private providers great latitude over the services they supply to their cli-
ents–the so-called “black box delivery model”–whereas its Australian counterpart lays
down quite strict guidelines over the range of services to be supplied to clients. The ex-
pectation was that between 2011 and 2016, the WP would assist over three million clients.
The second Coalition flagship change to the activation regime–Universal Credit
(UC)–is even more radical in ambition. It aims to unify all means-tested benefits (with
the exception of the Council Tax Benefit) into a single working-age benefit with a gen-
erous earnings disregard and a single withdrawal rate of benefits against work income.
Support for childcare via the benefit system will be made available for parents regard-
less of the number of hours they work–under the old system, they had to work at least
16 hours per week to qualify for support. The aim of UC is to improve work incentives
for most families compared with the current system. It is hoped that by getting more of
such families into work that this will reduce poverty and cut back on public spending
on welfare benefits. UC began to be implemented slowly in 2013 and it is planned to
be fully operational by 2018.
Both flagship changes to the UK’s activation regime are too recent to permit any
reliable ex-post evaluations of their effectiveness. In its first year of operation, WP
attracted much public criticism because job placements were below the initial projec-
tions made by DWP. But this was probably inevitable given the running-in problems
associated with such an innovation in the delivery of employment services. Perform-
ance has improved since then, especially for the long-term unemployed and youth21.
However, it is still the case that attempts to activate more of the disabled into
work have been particularly difficult and led to much unfavourable comment in
the media. Finn (2014) argues that prime contractors have been reluctant to invest
in more intensive services to help the most disadvantaged clients, and the pricing
model has encouraged “creaming”.
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tems needed to produce real-time information on incomes will deliver effectively and
on time and the Treasury will be prepared to stump up the extra funding needed to
ensure that UC produces relatively few losers compared with winners. Unless the add-
itional labour supply and work effort forthcoming from the latter outweighs the reduc-
tions in labour supply and work effort supplied by the former, it is unclear whether UC
will produce a positive benefit-cost ratio.
In sum, the OECD’s activation reviews have highlighted examples of both success in
terms of activating UI benefit recipients (Australia, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, UK)
and failures, at least until recently (Finland, Ireland). They have also highlighted the
very different choices which countries have made about the design and implementation
of their activation regimes, choices which have been strongly determined by different
starting points, institutions and culture. Thus, countries with relatively generous benefit
systems have been able to implement relatively successful activation regimes by enfor-
cing relatively strict benefit conditionality and making effective use of ALMPs
(Switzerland, Norway, Finland). Other countries have implemented successful activa-
tion regimes against a background of less generous benefit systems (Japan, United
Kingdom). All but one country (Australia) has chosen to make the PES the crucial
actor in delivering activation. Finally, it has proved very difficult to transfer success in
activating UI benefit recipients to other recipients of inactive benefits, notably those in
receipt of long-term sickness/disability benefits.4.8 Bottom line
In this and the previous section, we have reviewed evidence on the effectiveness of
ALMPs and activation from three different sources: (i) micro evaluations of individual
ALMPs; (ii) macroeconomic evaluations of ALMPs; and (iii) country case studies of
activation strategies. What are the common threads concerning outcomes which can be
drawn from these sources?
First, the micro literature tells us that the composition of ALMPs matters in terms of
what works and what does not, as do very practical issues of programme design and
implementation. Second, the macro literature confirms that the composition of ALMPs
matters for the outcomes but so does the scale of public investment in them. Both mi-
cro and macro studies suggest that ALMPs are not a magic bullet in terms of lowering
unemployment. Even when they are effective, the net impacts are not large once ac-
count is taken of deadweight and displacement effects. Third, the country case studies
highlight the important role that cost-effective ALMPs play in an activation strategy
but show that others factors matter too if the strategy is to be successful. In particular,
it is necessary to take account of the potentially important interactions between UI/UA
benefit systems and the intensity of activation, especially if the former are relatively
generous. In the latter case, it is vital to monitor and control tightly the job-search
activity of benefit recipients in order to maintain work incentives.5 4. Some unanswered questions about activation
A first, very topical question concerns the ability of activation to deliver good labour
market outcomes in a steep downturn when the supply of job vacancies is reduced
Martin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:4 Page 21 of 29significantly. Critics of activation often claim that it is a “fair-weather” instrument: it
can work only when labour demand is buoyant, making it easy to impose benefit condi-
tionality. When labour demand is depressed, they claim it makes little sense to activate
job seekers since all it will achieve is to reshuffle the queue of the unemployed.
But this negative view of activation ignores the evidence provided above that coun-
tries which have been successful in implementing activation have weathered the recent
storm of the Great Recession relatively well. Countries as diverse as Finland, Japan,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom have all experienced more moderate increases in
unemployment since 2007–8 than would have been expected on the basis of previous
cyclical patterns. This suggests that effective activation strategies can help make labour
markets more resilient to adverse demand shocks.
But it is one thing to argue that effective activation can work in bad times as well as
good times; it is another to argue that the mix of policies underlying an effective activa-
tion strategy does not need adjusting to the state of labour demand. For example, when
labour demand is depressed, should the emphasis on benefit conditionality be weak-
ened and more resources devoted to ALMPs22? This question is often posed in terms
of a shift from a so-called “work-first” approach to a “train-first” approach. The ration-
ale for such a shift in the activation mix is that the opportunity costs of investing in
training for the unemployed, especially those at high risk of long-term unemployment,
fall during a steep downturn as the exit rates from unemployment to a job decline.
There is some limited econometric evidence from the Nordic countries that suggests it
is worthwhile to shift the stance of activation policies towards greater investment in
long-duration training during a steep downturn23. But it is not easy to accept this
argument uncritically. Investment in training tends to be more costly for the public
purse than spending on other ALMPs, and it is not easy to expand the supply of cost-
effective training quickly in response to a cyclical downturn24.
Nor is it always clear that a “work-first” approach is less effective in a period of high
unemployment. Michaelides (2013) provides experimental evidence from a reemploy-
ment programme which was implemented by the US state of Nevada during the Great
Recession. This experiment required a random sample of new UI claimants to attend a
one-to-one meeting with a caseworker in the first three weeks of their UI claim as a
condition of remaining eligible for benefits. The purpose of the meeting was to deter-
mine whether the claimant was in fact eligible for benefits and actively seeking work.
Claimants who either failed to attend the interview or failed the eligibility test were im-
mediately disqualified from benefits. The results showed a significant cut in the average
duration of unemployment and in public spending on benefits. Importantly, the
programme increased significantly the exit rate from UI receipt to employment. In
another study, Martins and Pessoa e Costa (2014) evaluated a large activation
programme which was introduced in Portugal in 2012 when the unemployment rate
hovered around 16%. Their results showed that, despite the depressed state of labour
demand, the activation programme doubled the monthly exit rate to a job.
A second question concerns how best to extend activation approaches to benefit
recipients of working age who are not as close to the labour market as the typical re-
cipient of UI benefits. Activation, as the OECD country reviews have revealed, works
best for those benefit recipients who are relatively job-ready. Activation can also be
relatively successful for lone parents with young children so long as the supports provided
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policies are less successful in helping recipients of long-term sickness/disability benefits to
find work–the Australian, Norwegian, Swiss and UK reviews testify to this relative failure.
In addition, other OECD reviews have highlighted the fact that a large share of the inflows
to long-term sickness/disability benefits are accounted for by people with mental ill-
health–employers are extremely reluctant to engage with such people.
There is another political economy issue which comes to the fore when activation ap-
proaches are extended to recipients of disability benefits: is there general public support
for such a move? The evidence shows that public opinion is usually favourable to acti-
vation policies targeted to the unemployed. However, there is much less public support
for extending benefit conditionality and activation approaches to people with health
problems. The disabled, in particular, have very active lobby groups in all countries,
and these lobbies are very reticent about activation. The UK provides a very clear
example of such reticence. Since 2008, the attempt to activate ESA recipients has been
a continual source of public concern, often focalising around the use (or abuse as the
lobbies tend to argue) of the WCA in order to shift people off disability benefit and on
to JSA. Attempts have been made to refine the WCA to remedy deficiencies, but
assessments are often challenged and overturned on appeal. Nor is this problem of lack
of public support for activating people with health problems confined to the UK, such
reticence also exists in other countries too, e.g., Australia, Switzerland and Norway.
Given the large numbers of working-age people on such benefits and the relatively
low exit rates from such benefits to work, it has to be a very high priority to determine
how activation strategies can be made more effective for people with health-related is-
sues. What mix of rehabilitation, benefit conditionality and workplace supports could
work better for such people than the current one? How can one achieve the necessary
coordination between the health care sector, the PES and private employment service
providers, rehabilitation and employers so as to boost the employment and career pros-
pects for the disabled with some work capacity? How can the authorities convince the
public that it is legitimate to apply activation to people with health problems?
A third question concerns the kind of career opportunities which activation can
generate for benefit recipients who find work. The evidence shows that many
benefit recipients are activated to take low-wage jobs which do not offer great
career prospects and which may not lift them and their families permanently out
of poverty. So the aim of an effective activation regime should be not only to get
people off benefits and into work, but also to help them access “quality” jobs.
This is much easier said than done. One track has been for the PES to offer con-
tinued support to clients even after they have exited benefits into a job, with the
aim of ensuring that they can stay in the job and enjoy some career progression.
Such supports may involve counselling or help with training. A few countries
have tried this (including the UK), but there is relatively little evaluation evidence
as to its effectiveness. Another track is to reward private providers for sustainable
jobs by paying outcome fees linked directly to the durability of the job and the
degree of earnings progression. But there is very little rigorous evaluation evi-
dence on such post-employment supports, so the jury is still out on this question.
Fourth, given the trend towards subcontracting private employment service providers
to operate alongside the PES, or in the extreme replacing it entirely as was done in
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order to secure the desired outcomes for the clients at an acceptable cost to the public
purse. Different countries have opted for different solutions on this front, and it is un-
clear yet what common lessons can be drawn. Australia, which has gone down this
route the longest and adopted the most radical approach of eliminating the PES, shows
that it is important to learn from each contract round and to vary the terms of the suc-
ceeding contracts in ways that will improve outcomes. In particular, the Australian ex-
ample shows how important it is to develop indicators to rank the performance of the
private providers. Its Star Rating system is used to drive poor performers out of the
market in the next contract round or to reduce the size of their client flow while
expanding the market share of above-average performers25.
Another important issue associated with creating a quasi-market in employment ser-
vices concerns the design of the remuneration system for the private providers. How
can one minimise “creaming” of the clients by the private providers, and how can one
motivate them to achieve good placements into sustainable jobs for the most disadvan-
taged clients? Here, we note a significant difference in the approaches followed in
Australia and the UK. In the former case, two thirds of the money is tied up in service
fees and the Employment Pathway Account (a fund which is earmarked for the pur-
chase of specific employment services for the jobseeker), while only one third is tied
directly to job outcomes. In the WP, attachment fees are small and will disappear after
April 2014 so that provider income will then depend solely on job outcomes and
sustainability in work fees. It is unclear which of these two provider payment models is
optimal and under what conditions.
The final question concerns the potential role of e-services in the market for employ-
ment services: will they prove to be a help or a hindrance for effective activation? The
internet has great potential to impact the recruitment market since the cost of job
search and recruiting workers online is very low compared with the traditional recruit-
ment channels including the PES. At the same time, the PES, like most public agencies,
is under pressure to cut its costs and deliver its services more effectively. One possible
avenue for such cost-saving is via greater reliance on e-services to help place more of
its clients into jobs. This is not just a theoretical possibility. Currently, 90% of un-
employment benefit recipients in the Netherlands are being treated via e-services, and
only 10% of clients–those profiled as being at the highest risk of long-term unemploy-
ment–are receiving face-to-face treatment. The Finnish PES also intends to move in a
similar direction in order to cut costs and target its resources more to the most-
disadvantaged job seekers. Private employment service providers have a strong incen-
tive to rely more heavily on e-services as a way of cutting costs and boosting their
profits.
We do not know how effective such e-services are nor which clients they might work
for best, if they work at all. Until recently, Kuhn (2014) highlights that there was little
empirical evidence that the internet was having a significant effect on job search or re-
cruitment outcomes. However, more recent US studies suggest that the picture is chan-
ging, and workers and firms are beginning to find ways of using the internet more
effectively to make job matches. But these studies relate only to the United States, and
they do not focus specifically on how the internet and social networking sites have
impacted the core business of the PES.
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and Switzerland show that PES case workers and the approaches they use to activate
their clients matter for the return to work. This suggests that personalised counselling
and monitoring of job-search and employability actions are important building blocks
of effective activation which require face-to-face contacts with clients and which cannot
be substituted for by e-services.6 5. Concluding remarks
The concept of activating benefit recipients into work has become an important build-
ing block in OECD and EU countries’ strategies to fight high unemployment. The con-
cept has evolved over time in the light of both theoretical understanding of the
interactions between benefit systems, labour market institutions and active labour mar-
ket policies and detailed reviews of different countries’ experiences.
An ongoing series of OECD reviews of individual countries has highlighted the fact
that activation regimes differ greatly in their scope and intensity across EU and OECD
countries, reflecting their different starting points, histories, institutional settings and
cultures. They all involve different combinations of job-search monitoring, benefit con-
ditionality and referral to ALMPs.
Both the macroeconometric evidence involving cross-country data sets and the de-
tailed OECD activation reviews reveal that effective activation regimes work in the
sense of assisting the unemployed to get off benefits and into work. The mix of policies
which determines whether the activation strategy is effective or not varies across coun-
tries. But the evidence also shows that some countries have played lip service to activa-
tion principles or failed to implement them effectively; in these cases, the outcomes
were disappointing. There is also the fact that activation regimes have proved to be
most effective for UI benefit recipients and also for recipients of sole-parent benefits
when assistance is provided for child care. However, the record of activating recipients
of disability benefits into work is much less successful in all countries that have tried to
go down this route.
Finally, the Great Recession and its aftermath have posed new challenges to activa-
tion regimes, and there remain some unanswered questions concerning key design and
implementation features associated with activation.7 Endnotes
1. For example, optimal tax considerations suggest, for reasonable values of labour
supply elasticities, that the optimal schedule should consist of a relatively low benefit
replacement rate which declines over the duration of the benefit spell. However, it is
important to take note of the fact that in reality almost all benefit systems impose some
conditionality requirements, e.g., that the recipient must take active steps to find work
or to improve his employability. The latter require strict monitoring of jobseeker be-
haviour and/or referrals to specific ALMPs. If these conditions are not met, a benefit
sanction is imposed. In this way, it is possible to trade-off relatively high benefit re-
placement rates against maintaining reasonable work incentives, as is the case in some
European countries. Such a trade-off is a key part of the well-known Danish “flexicur-
ity” model.
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3. See Baily and Tobin (1977).
4. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the cross-country analysis of the impact
of ALMPs on unemployment dynamics, i.e., the inflow (outflow) rate to (from)
unemployment in OECD (OECD 2009, Chapter 1).
5. See OECD (2013a, Chapter 3) for an overview of the lessons from the ongoing ac-
tivation reviews.
6. See Grubb et al. (2009).
7. See Duell et al. (2009b).
8. See Duell et al. (2009a).
9. See Duell et al. (2009b).
10. See Duell et al. (2010a).
11. See OECD (2012b).
12. See OECD (2014c).
13. The terms of the troika (composed of the IMF, European Commission and the
European Central Bank) bailout for Ireland have laid much emphasis on structural
reforms to the benefit and activation regimes in Ireland along the lines of those spelt
out in Grubb et al. (2009).
14. See Lowe (2014).
15. For a very recent critique, see Department of Public Expenditure and Reform
(2014).
16. It is, however, worth noting that evaluations in Switzerland have shown that acti-
vation works better in the German-speaking cantons than it does in either the French-
speaking or Italian-speaking cantons. This suggests that cultural factors and/or different
social norms determine partly the outcomes of activation strategies.
17. For details, see Behncke et al. (2008, 2010). Nor is the evaluation evidence that
caseworkers can make a real difference to outcomes confined to Switzerland: see Van
den Berg et al. (2012) for similar evidence from Denmark.
18. The replacement rate for a sickness absence is 100%, and Norwegian employers only
pay the first 16 days of sickness benefit–which is relatively short compared with the rules
in other OECD countries–and after that, the benefit is paid by the public purse.
19. The prime contractors then subcontract services and clients through a supply
chain which they manage.
20. However, the attachment fee is temporary, and from April 2014, prime contrac-
tors will be paid solely on the basis of employment outcomes and the degree to which
they are sustainable over time.
21. See OECD (2014c) for a detailed review and critique of the Work Programme.
22. A related issue is whether the duration of unemployment benefits should vary
over the business cycle in order to better support aggregate demand. See OECD (2011),
pp. 68–71) and Lalive et al. (2013) for discussions of this issue.
23. See Forslund et al. (2011) and Norlund (2009).
24. There is also the non-negligible hurdle to overcome that many countries lack
adequate performance management systems to benchmark the quality of training pro-
vided to the unemployed by either public or private training providers.
25. The use of Star Ratings as a means of raising the average performance of the pri-
vate providers marks a sharp contrast between the Australian and Dutch experiences
Martin IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:4 Page 26 of 29with activation relying upon private providers. The latter devolved responsibility for the
provision of most activation services to the most at-risk groups to the municipalities to
subcontract with private providers. But no nationwide system to benchmark provider
performance was put in place alongside this shift in delivery of the services. This is one
important explanation why the Dutch experience with subcontracting private providers
of employment services has been much less successful than the Australian experience.
8 Appendix 1. A brief history of the activation concept
There is an exhaustive discussion of how the concept has evolved from the 1950s to
the present day in Weishaupt (2011). It suffices to say that for several decades thinking
about the concept and policy recommendations were dominated by the so-called
“Swedish view” of ALMPs, which is associated with the names of its principal archi-
tects, Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. Rehn also had a major influence on the inter-
national debates on the concept thanks to his position as Head of the OECD’s
Manpower Directorate from 1962 to 1973.
In the Rehn-Meidner model, ALMPs had a crucial role to play in helping to reduce
structural unemployment and ensuring that counter-cyclical policy did not run into in-
flationary bottlenecks. Following the two oil shocks of the 1970s and the prolonged
stagflation of the 1980s and early 1990s, this view of ALMPs still held sway. This can
be seen clearly in the OECD’s 1994 Jobs Study. One of the 10 principal recommenda-
tions of the Jobs Study was to “Expand and enhance active labour market policies”. The
thinking behind this specific recommendation was two-fold: (i) shift the weight of
public spending on labour market policies away from unemployment benefits to more
active measures which assist reemployment; and (ii) enhance the effectiveness of
ALMPs. Another of the 10 recommendations related to the “Reform of unemployment
and related benefit systems”. The two-fold thrust behind this particular recommenda-
tion was: (i) to limit work disincentive effects; and (ii) reform tax/benefit systems so as
to make work pay.
However, it is noticeable, with the benefit of hindsight, that there was little or no rec-
ognition in the Jobs Study of the need to take account of potentially important interac-
tions between these two specific recommendations. The same criticism can be made of
the early versions of the European Employment Guidelines which were first adopted by
the Amsterdam Summit in 1997. They incorporated a guideline entitled “Transition
from passive measures to active measures” under one of the four main pillars of the
Guidelines, “Improving employability”.
But a series of OECD and European Commission country reviews of the implementa-
tion of the Jobs Study recommendations and the European Employment Guidelines
over the subsequent decade, together with academic research, has produced a major
change in thinking on the appropriate definition of activation. A key paper in the latter
was the 1997 paper by Coe and Snower, who highlighted for the first time the potential
for complementarities between policies and institutions in the fight against high and
persistent unemployment. This issue was then first investigated empirically in a cross-
country panel data study by Elmeskov et al. (1998). Since then, there have been many
such empirical studies in a similar vein–see, for example, Bassanini and Duval (2006,
2009)–many of which have stressed the complementarity between ALMPs and un-
employment insurance and related welfare benefit systems.
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Study recommendations in the mid-2000s, it had adopted a much richer view of activa-
tion encompassing the interactions between UI/UA systems, ALMPs and benefit condi-
tionality. This was fully articulated in OECD (2006) and taken on board in the later
iterations of the European Employment Guidelines.
9 Appendix 2. the OECD/Eurostat labour market policy (LMP) database
OECD and Eurostat have been collecting and publishing comparable data on labour
market policies for well over two decades. These data are widely used by analysts and
policy makers. But it is important to understand the key concepts used to include or
exclude specific measures in the data base. The first and most important criterion for
inclusion is that it covers publically financed programmes. The second key criterion for
inclusion in the database is that the measure must be targeted to a specific group of in-
dividuals who are at risk in the labour market.
At the same time, the database excludes many ALMPs which exist in a wide range of
countries. Let me just cite three examples of important exclusions from the database. A
first exclusion concerns in-work benefits. There are many prominent examples of these
kinds of programme, including the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States,
Family Income Supplement in Ireland, the Working Tax Credit in the UK, the Prime
pour l’emploi in France, etc. These are not included in the database when they are not
conditional on the search for more work. A second exclusion covers measures that tar-
get all members of a group at statistical risk, for example, wage subsidies for all young
people or for people employed in depressed regions. Lastly, measures that pay a wage
subsidy for an indefinite period are also excluded. For example, sheltered work pro-
grammes, which generally exist for very long periods and pay one hundred per cent
wage subsidies for handicapped workers, are excluded.
9.1 Data comparability issues
I would now like to turn to some of the comparability issues which arise when one
wishes to use the data base to make cross-country comparisons. There are issues about
the borderline, i.e., what is included and what is excluded from the database. One clas-
sic illustration of this is the treatment of public spending on apprenticeships which dif-
fers across countries. For example, France and Italy include most of their public
spending on apprenticeships in the database. But in other countries, due to the target-
ing criteria, only a fraction of the total public support for apprentices is included, and
only insofar as it is support that is targeted on individuals that are facing difficulties in
the labour market.
Data for some of the non-EU countries can suffer from the exclusion of programmes
that should be included. This is particularly a problem in some of the federal non-
European countries, e.g., the US, Canada and Australia. So the coverage of ALMPs at
the sub-national level in federal countries may well be underestimated.
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